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III. A Vulnerable Glance: 
Seeing Dance through Phenomenology 
Sondra Fraleigh 
When phenomenology is true to its intent, it never knows 
where it is going (1). This is because it is present-centered in 
its descriptive aims, accounts for temporal change, and does 
not have appropriate and inappropriate topics. It might move 
from Zen to dance to baseball to washing dishes, and even 
isolate a purity of attention that under certain circumstances 
connects them all. Phenomenology develops unpredictably, 
according to the contents of consciousness. This is its first 
level of method. Its second level develops philosophical 
perspectives from the seed of consciousness. It holds that 
"philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth but, like 
art, the act of bringing truth into being" (2). Here I will discuss 
phenomenology as a way of describing and defining dance, 
shifting between the experience of the dancer and that of the 
audience. 
Experiential Truth 
Phenomenology depends on immediate experience, but in- 
cludes more. It hopes to arrive at meaning, perspectives on the 
phenomena of experience (dance in this case) which can be 
communicated. It is not devoid of past and future, since both 
are lived as part of the present. Present time takes its meaning 
in part from past and future. Heidegger described time as 
belonging to the totality of being, as "the horizon of being." He 
chose the vulnerable image of falling to describe the lived 
dimension of present time. Falling is both a movement and a 
symbol of our existential mode of being-in-the-world (3). 
Existence is not static. It moves always just beyond our 
grasp. It has no specific shape, no texture, no taste (because it 
is nowhere). Yet we assume it is something. We can't see it 
(because it is everywhere), and we feel its perpetual "dance" 
inside us. It is of the essence of vulnerability. It surfaces to 
attention through reflection in literature, history, and philos- 
ophy, with the urgency of word and gesture, formulations of 
concrete materials, the actions and passions of drama, and the 
infinite combinations of sound and bodily motion in the 
various arts. Here psychic life, visible form, and experiential 
truth merge; thought and feeling converge, and meaning arises. 
Art is an attempt to give substance to existence, that we may 
gain insight through distilling life's ongoing nature, repeating 
selected gestures, motions, and sounds, molding and maintain- 
ing certain shapes. Art in its various forms holds these before 
our senses. It allows us to absorb the textures, meanings, and 
motions of a perishable bodily existence. Art and existence are 
both within the context or "horizon" of time. Both are subject 
to the ways in which time is lived-compressed, elongated, 
endless, a long time, a short time, barely enough time, etc. 
Lived time does not refer to clock time, but to how time feels. 
Falling in love may take "an instant," for example, and some 
chores may "never" get done. 
Heidegger also describes the "ecstasy of time"-those times 
when past and future are realized in the present-as "the 
moment of vision" (4). We say we "lose track of time" when 
we become fully involved in an experience; then conscious- 
ness is not divided, and an act or thought emerges from a 
present-centeredness. Insight, or moments of vision, as we 
take "sight" as the basis for "insight," depends on our experi- 
encing the fullness of present time. Lived dualisms (tugs, 
pulls, and scatterings of attention) disappear, and the unity of 
our being is experienced. 
When I use the term phenomenology I mean existential 
phenomenology, the development of Edmund Husserl's phe- 
nomenological philosophy by later twentieth century existen- 
tialist philosophers: Martin Heidigger, Jean Paul Sartre, Paul 
Ricoeur, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gabriel Marcel. The 
common concern of these philosophers was to describe exis- 
tence from the "horizon" (Husserl's term for the "context" in 
which experiences arise) of being-in-the-world. Existential 
philosophy originated primarily in the thinking of men-with 
the exception of feminist Simone de Beauvior. As a revolt 
against traditional western philosophy, it developed several 
concerns consistent with feminists (see Addendum on Phe- 
nomenology and Feminism). Of particular interest is that the 
body (mythically associated with woman and the mystery of 
birth) has been ignored and denied by traditional philosophy, 
but is important in phenomenology, and is a central theme in 
existential phenomenology. 
Existential phenomenology is vulnerable because it rests on 
experiential descriptions of the lived world; more precisely, 
human experiences arising always in particular contexts of 
being-in-the-world. While much of male dominated philoso- 
phy has striven for invulnerability through logic and reason, 
phenomenology took up the risky position of experiential 
description. It is clear, however, that particular concerns have 
helped to shape phenomenological description, making it less 
relative than it would be without guiding principles or method. 
Phenomenology does not rely primarily on the uniqueness 
of experience. Overall, it is propelled by a universalizing 
impulse, since it hopes to arrive at shared meaning, recogniz- 
ing that this world is indeed "our world," that our being-in-the- 
world is conditioned by the existence of others. Self and other 
are terms that take on meaning in relation to each other. 
Individual subjectivity is therefore understood in view of its 
intersection with a surrounding world, constituted by other 
objects, natural phenomena, and other human beings. Inter- 
subjectivity is a given. It is the basis of both alienation and 
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communion, all possible shades of relation and solitude, for to 
be alone is to be (in fact, or feeling) without others. 
If there is a single guiding principle behind phenomenology, 
it derives from Husserl's repeated assertion that "conscious- 
ness is always consciousness of something." He first formu- 
lated his phenomenological method according to this concern 
in Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (5). 
Here he analyzed the basic structures of what he called 
"transcendental consciousness." Consciousness, he held, was 
the necessary condition for experience, or experience is pre- 
supposed by consciousness. Experience has both immanent 
and transcendent levels. Immanence is that which is held 
within consciousness, a memory in a stream of experience, for 
instance. Transcendence is not a mystical term here, nor does 
it necessarily mean an ecstatic level of consciousness. Tran- 
scendent consciousness is active since it unifies impressions, 
grasping phenomena in their entirety. (A phenomenon is 
anything that appears to consciousness.) Consciousness is 
transcendent because it refers beyond itself, attesting to a 
world of objects and the reality of others. It is the ground or 
possibility of our recognition of a world outside ourselves. 
Central to phenomenology is the understanding that we 
never perceive a phenomenon in static unchanging perspec- 
tives, but rather as existing through time. Time and motion are 
ever present conditions influencing attention and perspective. 
Nevertheless, consciousness can unify experience. For ex- 
ample, when one considers a particular phenomenon such as a 
dance, one not only has changing sense impressions of the 
dance as it flows through time, but also insight into the essence 
of the dance. By essence here I mean that something is 
discerned which characterizes or typifies the dance, so that it 
is recognized as itself and not some other dance. The dance 
then becomes more than sense impressions of motion. The 
essence of the dance is not identical with its motion. It arises 
in consciousness as the motion reveals the intent of the whole 
and its parts. Consciousness transcends separate acts of 
perception to unify our experience of phenomena. 
Essence: Identity 
When I look at a dance I perceive something of the work's 
identity, its individuality. Not only do I perceive it-I con- 
sciously construct it. That is, I imbue the work with the 
meaning I find there as a viewer (or critic). This requires both 
my perceptual grasp and conscious integration of the work. 
For example, it is obvious that Cunningham's work Eleven 
takes its title from the eleven performers in the dance. It is also 
strongly identified with the mantra-like word/sound score. In 
the following description, part of the work's identity emerges 
for me: 
The text is sparse, with sound and silence coming at 
intervals and chanted in monotone, returning over and 
over, lending to the meditative quality of the whole. 
Duets, solos, trios, and other groups collect and dis- 
perse without emotional impetus, like a hand plays 
easily with an intricate design when the design begins 
to lead the hand unconsciously into the next figure. 
However, the exact movement, its energies and space/ 
time configuration, is unique to Eleven. At one point, 
there is a long stalking sequence with body leans and 
leg extensions. It finally develops into a reaching walk 
with the body twisting and turning on one foot, ending 
with the torso bending over the leg, and an arm 
dangling, the hand tracing a circle, actually outlining 
it on the floor. 
This sequence contributes to the individuality of Eleven for 
me. Others may pay attention in a different manner, thus 
consciously constructing aspects I don't see. When I reflect 
back and relate this work to other Cunningham dances, I 
understand that their lack of overt expressiveness focuses my 
attention on intricate tangles of sound, movement, color, lines 
of energy, shape, and design. Thus, I see them as abstract and 
formal, or form become content. I further notice that my 
attention becomes cleared and concentrated toward the end of 
his dances, like the concentrated attention of the dancers. 
The phenomenologist approaches the task of defining or 
describing a phenomenon (a dance or a dance experience, for 
instance) as though seeing it fresh for the first time. Of course 
this is not possible since we do have conceptions, attitudes, and 
assumptions which color understanding. Phenomenology is at 
best an effort to remove bias and preconception from con- 
sciousness. It aims to describe through some direct route, not 
to analyze and theorize (at least not in the beginning), but first 
to describe the immediate contents of consciousness. 
As Husserl endeavored to clarify how experience is unified 
in consciousness, he eventually extended his phenomenology 
to what he called a "science of essences." This remains the 
most controversial aspect of his philosophy. Existentialism 
never embraced phenomenology as a science, rather it devel- 
oped the original method initiated by Husserl of "bracketing" 
the natural attitude-that is, suspending all common assump- 
tions (presuppositions) about phenomena and removing theo- 
retical or analytical biases. This narrowing of attention to 
essential elements is called phenomenological reduction. 
Phenomenology strives to capture pre-reflective experi- 
ence, the immediacy of being-in-the-world. I think of this 
initial impulse of phenomenology (the basis of phenomeno- 
logical reduction) as poetic and subliminal, containing mo- 
ments of insight into an experience when the details of "being 
there" are vivid in feeling, but have not had time to focus in 
thought. The subsequent descriptive process may also be 
similar to the poetic; both are grounded in experience and 
require reflection, or a looking back on the experience to bring 
it to language. It is further significant that both poetry and 
phenomenological reduction seek the essence of experience, a 
re-creation in words of the living of the experience, as the most 
salient features arise in consciousness and others drop away. 
In this, the phenomenologist knows that finally she cannot 
strip away her own consciousness, nor would she want to, 
however much she may rid herself of baggage in terms of 
previous knowledge or attitudes. Consciousness and more- 
over her particular consciousness, will be a part of the experi- 
ence and its description. (This could be compared to Sklar's 
point on ethnography and self-reflexivity in the second article 
in this series. See also Addendum on Phenomenology and 
Ethnography). 
Meaning 
Let's take an example again from Cunningham: I notice in 
general that his dances use the geometrically clean lines of 
ballet, even though they are overlaid with radical departures 
from typical ballet geometry, and that the performer is cool and 
detached (as others have also noticed). The male dancer is not 
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simply a prop for the female as in ballet stereotypes since much 
of their dancing together develops unison and equality, but the 
partnering per se continues the classical/romantic dependence 
of the female as she leans on or is held and lifted (however 
dispassionately) by the male. With comparisons to ballet, I am 
of course bringing to consciousness my background in dance, 
and I move from the purely descriptive to the comparative and 
analytical. This comes about naturally as a result of first 
recognizing attenuated lines and geometric forms. However, 
I would miss what seems a major point of Cunningham's 
works if I let them rest with balletic influence. In Doubles, for 
instance, dancers are seen in problem solving modes, and the 
balletic movement serves more as a background for this to 
occur, as my attempt to describe a part of the dance indicates: 
One movement motif develops out of a small leap 
stubbornly turned to the back at the landing, then 
stopped in a balanced position on one leg. Small leaps 
eventually turn to giant steps with voluminous pauses. 
An incomplete stop-action fall is the most memorable 
of the work's challenges to the dancer's skill and the 
choreographer's inventiveness. The dancer falls side- 
ways without warning or preparation in a sudden drop 
to his hands. He recovers from the fall but not 
completely, getting up only half-way, reaching that 
difficult to control mid-zone between standing and 
falling, only to fall again and again from an incomplete 
recovery. The dance's repetition of this series draws 
upon my body's memory, touching those murky mo- 
ments in experience where something is about to 
happen, but never quite breaks through. 
The foregoing is an example of my consciousness of one 
aspect of Doubles. It is true for me, it contains both descrip- 
tive, interpretive, and evaluative elements. One of the major 
purposes of phenomenological description is to build toward 
meaning. Then others may be able to see what you see, or at 
least understand what you see. The truths of dance are not 
scientific or irrefutable. They are of another order, created by 
the choreographer, the dancer, the audience, and the critic. 
Good critics do phenomenology naturally, describing without 
pre-judging, and then drawing forth the meaning they find. 
They exercise their consciousness of the dance in writing 
about it, finally delineating its values (and disvalues) for them. 
Critics, like phenomenologists, try to speak the truth of their 
own experience clearly, so that others may find meaning in it. 
The admission of the primacy of consciousness is central to 
existential phenomenology, distinguishing it from scientific 
phenomenology, claims to distill (reduce) phenomena to pure 
essences of ideas (eidos) through "eidetic reduction." A 
phenomenology which takes for granted our being-in-the- 
world owes more to insight than to an objective scientific 
stance. Existential phenomenology is vulnerable because it 
admits this level of subjectivity. It allows for irrationality and 
accident as human concerns. It is also paradoxical. While it 
seeks to describe the essence of things, it acknowledges the 
impossibility of knowing things purely as objects, since ob- 
jects are relative to our perception of them. It celebrates 
subjectivity without surrendering to a view of a privatized or 
narcissistic world where individual consciousness is isolated, 
understanding and community an impossibility. It is the desire 
to reach beyond the boundaries of one's own consciousness to 
understand how consciousness is human which in fact moti- 
vates existential phenomenology. 
Definition 
Merleau-Ponty held that phenomenology united the poles of 
subjectivism and objectivism in its philosophical approach 
(6). We know that it was also an attempt, in its formulation of 
the existential concept of "the lived body," to mend the 
subject/object (mind/body) split in Western attitudes toward 
the body (7). When I turn to phenomenology, I am aware of a 
nondualistic way of using language, and seek modes of ex- 
pression that will most closely appropriate the experience I 
wish to describe. Out of the descriptive process, I understand 
that I will be defining dance while drawing my readers into the 
process with me. In its own way, a description is a definition. 
My process of phenomenological writing develops defini- 
tional anchors and experiential description toward an over- 
view. Otherwise, I would lose my reader in a stream of 
consciousness which, however meaningful to me, may seem 
pointless and rambling to the reader. My philosophical obli- 
gation is to extract the meaningful essentials, to communicate 
to the reader well founded points of reference. These often 
come through questioning, even through questioning the 
questions. 
For instance, instead of asking the typical question What is 
dance, I might get a fresh approach to my subject by asking 
another definitional question, such as When is dance happen- 
ing, as I have in a recent paper. If I can answer the second 
question, I will be answering the first, and from a perspective 
that will not allow me to revert to assumed definitions. I 
examine this question descriptively from the dancer's 
experiential perspective: 
When I dance, I am subtly attuned to my body and my 
motion in a totally different way than I ordinarily am 
in my everyday actions. That is, I seldom take notice 
of my ordinary comings and goings. I'm either in a 
rush, just getting things done, or maybe couch 
potatoing, trying to get going. The point is I'm not 
really paying much attention to my movement. I'm 
just doing it (or not, as the case my be). But, when I 
dance, I am acutely aware of my movement. I study it, 
try out new moves, study and perfect them, until I 
eventually turn my attention to their subtleties of 
feeling, and meaning. Finally, I feel free in them. In 
other words, I embody the motion. When I make any 
movement truly mine, I embody it. And in this, I 
experience what I would like to call "pure presence," 
a radiant power of feeling completely present to my- 
self and connected to the world. This could also be 
described in other ways, but I think dancing moments 
can be named. These are those moments when our 
intentions toward the dance are realized. (8) 
Further questions crop up immediately. What kinds of 
intentions are these? Is my intentionality in dance different 
from my intentionality in other kinds of movement? The 
subject of "the aesthetic" as it applies to performance would 
then become important, since one apparent distinction be- 
tween dance movement and everyday actions is that dance is 
"performed" with qualitative attention toward the movement 
(even when it is not performed for others). Or we could say the 
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movement is intentionally designed and performed, not merely 
habitual and functional nor purely accidental. My description 
obligates me to look into these aesthetic distinctions and 
whether they might hold for all forms and cultures. It is also 
apparent from the description that the movement is not only 
intentionally performed, but it is also performed for itself, for 
the experience of moving this way. And there may be purposes 
beyond this intrinsic one that appear in dance according to 
cultural contexts. Most of our movement accomplishes some 
objective; it gets us some place or accomplishes a task. 
Generally dance movement does not, especially theatre dance. 
Rather its values are not utilitarian or practical; they are 
affective or aesthetic. In terms of human movement, aesthetic 
intent implicates intrinsic values which inhere in actions, be 
they appreciated for their beauty or for some other affective 
quality. (My brief description included affective aspects of 
freedom.) 
Imagination 
Still another aspect of aesthetic intent is involved. The dancer 
deals not just with movement, but with the motivational 
source, idea, or metaphor behind the movement, that which the 
movement will bring to mind. Even if the dance is stylistically 
abstract, it will draw our attention to its unique unfolding of 
movement patterns in space-time. Movement patterns are also 
images, and they impress the imagination, as the word "image" 
implies. 
The imaginative, or meaningful, level of the dance may be 
the focus ofphenomenological description. Clearly there would 
be many ways into this, and the description would be influ- 
enced by the full intent of the dance-theatrical, ritual, social, 
etc. In the following description based on phrases of original 
choreography, I carry through my consciousness of freedom as 
a compelling experience in dance and discover that dance is 
less ephemeral than I have supposed: 
My dance contains an original structure all its own, 
however related or unrelated to the world from whence 
it springs. As I move up, down, or spin around, I feel 
the purity of these directions. As movements, they 
take on specific identity. My own identity merges 
with the movement I experience. And I can repeat it. 
To a great extent, my dance is repeatable; it has 
permanence, but my life moves always into the future. 
I cannot relive it, nor any part of it, as I can my dance. 
There are certain dance phrases I like to do again and 
again. They strike my imagination. In one there is an 
upward reach that seems to pull down the stars. I can 
depend on this happening. It is there when I do it. It 
fills me with wonder, and I feel free in it. In another 
more complex phrase, I also feel free, but it is more 
precarious. The phrase begins with a triangle of steps. 
First a glide forward on the right foot is mirrored with 
the left hand. As the glide gives in to a step to the left 
and rocks back to hold a step on the right, the hand 
polishes and smooths out the air over the triangle, then 
suspends in a momentary reach as the last step is held 
and the eyes look across the passing movement into 
the distance. Out of this, the left foot takes a soft lunge 
forward and grounds only enough to permit a slow 
smooth turn to the right, while the reaching arm folds 
at the elbow and the hand brushes the heart, then 
extends again. The head bows down as I return to the 
soft lunge beginning, completing the turn. This phrase 
always invokes feelings of tenderness and devotion in 
me. It holds the fullness of some special gratitude, the 
more because the slow turn is risky. I could fall short 
or overturn. When I do it well, I feel peaceful, serene, 
and free. 
Since phenomenology seeks to get at the core of things 
(phenomena), it aims for simplicity in the initial descriptive 
process. For me it often comes to rest on a single word, such 
as "freedom," as has come up thematically in the foregoing 
descriptions, but much depends on where I begin, the point of 
entry into my own consciousness of a particular dance experi- 
ence, and whether I am conscious of my own dancing or paying 
attention to the dances of others. I am also aware that what I 
already know experientially and theoretically eventually en- 
ters the picture, but it is questioned, expanded, reinforced, or 
discarded in the process of extracting core values. Contrary to 
what might be expected, it is not easy to see (and give word to) 
the most basic constitutive elements of phenomena without the 
support of common assumptions and dualistic habits of thought 
which favor the objective status of phenomena apart from their 
manifestations in subjective life. 
As a philosophical school, existential phenomenology re- 
turns to the traditional tasks of philosophy (9). Plato stated that 
"philosophy begins in wonder," and indeed this is the point of 
beginning for the phenomenologist. As I step back from my 
own processes to better understand them, I confess to giving 
myself up to a quest and questioning with a kind of blind faith 
that something in me already knows the answers, if I can 
somehow get out of my own way (remove my conditioning) 
long enough to glance them. 
Addendum on Phenomenology and Feminism 
While I don't identify existential phenomenology directly 
with feminism, I am aware that the anti-philosophers at the 
foundation of existentialism, Neitzsche and Kierkegaard and 
the later twentieth-century philosophers who extend that 
foundation with phenomenology, are in revolt against the 
traditions-especially the logic, essentialism, and idealism- 
of Western philosophy. They admit concerns into philosophy 
which are also important to feminists: the importance of 
individual consciousness, freedom, and choice. They are 
against determinism, and against the Western body/mind du- 
alism propagating the body as inferior that also concerns 
feminists. Indeterminacy, expressed by Sartre's familiar "ex- 
istence precedes essence," is at the root of existential self- 
responsibility and the existentially feminist assertion that 
biology is not destiny, as first taken up in the existentialist 
movement by Simone de Beauvior in The Second Sex. Exis- 
tential phenomenologists, like feminists, are deconstructing a 
Western hierarchy. 
Self and other are major existentialist themes, receiving 
their first extensive treatment as aspects of consciousness in 
existential phenomenology. Ann Daly's article in this series 
states that "woman has always been the other," and that women 
are consumed and debased in the objectifying "male gaze," 
suggesting a gender division according to intentions embodied 
in the act of looking at others. Sartre interpreted the "gaze of 
the other" as an objectifying and alienating gaze in Being and 
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Nothingness. He (a man) felt chill and usury in becoming the 
"object" of another's look, as he describes at length. One of his 
most popularized expressions became known as "the gaze of 
the other," fueling subsequent examinations in phenomenology 
and other areas of thought about what intentions gazes may 
contain and communicate. 
While Sartre gave the first phenomenological account of the 
affective power of the objectifying gaze, Gabriel Marcel 
described the other as a source of "communion." I take up both 
of their perspectives in examining dance performance as 
"body for other" in Dance and the Lived Body, developing a 
view that dance (though many of its practices may objectify the 
body) is in essence (or by definition) a human activity that 
seeks a bodily lived communion with others. 
Phenomenology has explored a wide spectrum of inten- 
tionally regarding the self in relation to others, holding that the 
other always arises in context and imbued with the com- 
plications of individual selves related to particular others. For 
phenomenologists there has been no one gender specific way 
of gazing, but nothing to preclude an examination of gender as 
influencing intention in any action. 
Questions concerning a possible "male gaze" and its impli- 
cations for dance arise immediately for me. As a phenome- 
nologist, I would need to examine the term without its rhetor- 
ical baggage to try to understand what men see, what they see 
when they look at women and when they look at women 
dancing (would reviews of male dance critics be useful?). If 
there is a pattern or way of looking so prevalent that it could be 
attributed to all or even most men, I would want to explore 
what intentions color or influence the pattern. I would need to 
set aside any assumptions I might have about what men see 
when they look at women, or I wouldn't be doing phenomenol- 
ogy. I would inevitably need to admit my own consciousness 
and to examine what I may be aware of when men look at me, 
or at my dancing. 
If I used the term "male gaze" as it originated in the film- 
feminism of Laura Mulvey and is adopted by Ann Daly, I 
would not be doing phenomenology. I would just be general- 
izing to make a point, and conflating objectifying gazes with 
maleness in men (and woman?). 
If, as a writer with feminist concerns and a phenomenolog- 
ical disposition, I took up a critique of "the male gaze" in the 
context of dehumanizing intentions attributed to it, I would 
have still other questions: what is the distinction between a 
possessive or consuming glance and one of erotic pleasure? 
Would an erotic magnetic attraction to the body of "the other" 
also be an aspect of the male gaze? If the female is "always the 
other," as Daly states, wouldn't this be the case? How then can 
we account for erotic pleasure in the way that women look at 
(perceive) the world and the bodies of others? Would we deny 
women erotic vision (seeing, looking, gazing)? Phenomeno- 
logically speaking (and as a woman), I know that I see, and I 
am also seen. On the other hand, I am also aware that as a 
woman, I have often been objectified in the gazes of men. 
However, it would not be so easy for me to generalize this 
perception, creating a lens through which I color the world and 
interpret the female as seen in dance (all dance). 
Addendum on Phenomenology and Ethnography 
Culture develops as people relate to each other and build 
common understandings and traditions. The phenomenolo- 
gist's admission of the subjective level of awareness is not 
clearly focused on the accumulated cultural knowledge that 
interests the ethnographer. Phenomenology aims first to 
describe immediately perceived features of anything, admit- 
ting the subjective character of perception. Cultural context 
inevitably arises in phenomenology in terms of "the other," or 
the ever present understanding that subjectivity is conditioned 
by our relation to others-intersubjectivity. The very notion 
of a self depends on the notion of an other (or others) separate 
and distinct from the self. The concept of culture further 
assumes that distinct individuals can build relationships and 
share meaning. A general task of phenomenology would be to 
expose these notions and the constructs of culture as elements 
of human consciousness-or perspectives that we take on life 
as we literally "make meaning" out of it. 
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